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Abstract 
 This paper studies the impact of foreign aid on economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean 
and determines whether this relationship is conditional on institutional quality, utilizing an index of 
accountability. I examine whether or not accountability structures rather than fiscal policies as used in Craig 
Burnside and David Dollar‟s 2000 article “Aid, Policies, and Growth” are a better determinant for overall 
economic growth. Using a database spanning 1996 to 2008, this paper examines the relationship between 
foreign aid and economic growth in 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries and seeks a clear definition of 
institutional quality. The findings of this study fail to indicate a significant relationship between foreign aid, 
institutional quality, and economic growth. The results show a negative relationship between the accountability 
index and economic growth in the region. This indicates the need for further research on uncovering the vague 
concept of institutional quality and good governance. Surprisingly, economic growth in Latin America may be 
positively affected by more authoritarian institutions such as state-owned banks, strong executive leadership, 





 Theoretically, foreign aid should be able to stimulate social and economic development in developing 
countries through an influx of money provided by more prosperous, developed countries. This aid should then 
stimulate economic development by building infrastructure, exporting new technologies and ideas, 
strengthening basic social services such as education, health, and political systems, providing humanitarian 
assistance during crises, and rejuvenating the economy after destructive, economic shocks. However, the direct 
relationship between foreign aid and economic growth has been hotly debated and after several decades of 
research, the results still remain inconclusive and ambiguous. In fact, several prominent authors have called for 
further analyses on the subject (Barro 1991; 2000; Durbarry, Gemmell and Greenaway 1998; Hansen and Tarp 
2001; Veiderpass and Andersson 2001; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2003).  Many investigations into this 
relationship conclude with positive, negative, or no direct correlations at all between aid and economic growth. 
The most important study in this highly contentious subject has been Burnside and Dollar‟s “Aid, Growth, and 
Policies” article, which determined that aid effectiveness was conditional on fiscal policy and institutional 
quality.  Almost every scholarly publication to date concerning foreign aid effectiveness has included this 
seminal work.  
 But what is institutional quality? What are its components? After Burnside and Dollar‟s pivotal research, 
there became a general consensus that variations in institutional quality can explain differences in economic 
development (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson 2001; 2002; Knack and Keefer 1995). Studies still utilize “good 
governance” or “institutional quality” indicators that group together a wide range of social structures affecting 
economic outcomes such as contract enforcement, property rights, investor protection, and the political system 
(Knack and Keefer 1995). However, there still remains little knowledge concerning what exactly determines 
institutional quality; what institutional characteristics create an environment conducive for foreign aid success. 
Understanding its components is the main focus of this paper.  
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 Finding the individual pieces that make up the vague concept of institutional quality could quite possibly 
be the solution to increased foreign aid efficacy. Once each component is discovered, agencies such as the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) can be more selective in providing aid to those countries exhibiting reform in these specific economic 
and political areas.  
 In this study, I focus on political institutions to determine what makes up this good institutional 
environment needed for economic growth. I believe institutions of accountability are critical. Accountable 
institutions are the foundations of good governance. These institutions ensure public officials‟ decisions are 
dependent on supervision; therefore, governments can function proficiently without corruption and also be 
responsive to the needs of the community. Along these lines, Paolo Fajardo-Heyward (2010) asserts that 
accountability is the institutional characteristic that better explains why leaders choose to be mindful of the 
rights of their citizens. For the most part, political leaders' principal goals are to achieve and maintain power. In 
order to do this, leaders need to please the principals (or the general citizenry), in particular those members of 
the population whose support is necessary to assure that they maintain office. But this is not always the norm. 
Agents (or leaders) sometimes stray from the preferences of their citizenry and enact policies that do not 
necessarily agree. This problem is known as agency loss. Levels of agency loss increase when principals and 
agents have conflicting interests and when the principals cannot fully know about their agents‟ decisions and 
actions through a lack of proper outlets for communication and information. In order to minimize agency loss, 
principals develop institutions to reward or punish agents' performance and guarantee that agents are held 
accountable to their principals. Institutional accountability offers the instruments needed to make sure that the 
leaders‟ performance is indeed committed to citizens' preferences. When institutions of accountability are 
developed in a country, there is more motivation for leaders to enact policies that complement the preferences 
of their electorate.  Political accountability is defined by two broad categories: answerability, the commitment 
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assigned to public officials to inform their constituents about their actions, decisions, and enforcement 
strategies, which are the capabilities of certain organizations to impose sanctions on public officials who violate 
such assigned duties (Stapenhurst and O‟Brien, 2010). Horizontal accountability is the ability of institutions to 
check violations by other institutions and branches of government. On the other hand, vertical accountability is 
the means through which citizens, mass media, and civil society call for the enforcement of good performance 
on officials. I have thus chosen five indicators of horizontal and vertical accountability for this study: 
1) The legislature‟s level of constraint on the decision-making power of chief executives; 
2) The presence of an independent judiciary; 
3) The assessment of bureaucratic quality and its handling of public services; 
4)  How much domestic credit is given to the private sector instead of to governments, government 
 agencies, and public enterprises (a proxy for central bank independence); and  
5) The level of freedom of press and media.  
 These five indicators should fully encompass the idea of accountability and also best represent the 
components for good governance or good institutional environments.  
 To investigate my theory empirically, I have concentrated on a panel of 19 Latin American countries, 
representing Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, during the time period from 1996 to 2008. 
Restricting the analysis to Latin America helps control for such variables as culture, language, and colonization 
heritage. The Iberian colonial heritage is a main determinant for the area‟s institutional heritage such as the 
distribution of land and presidential dominance (North and Weingast 2000). I have also drawn on the recent 
empirical growth literature to control for the range of institutional and policy components other than my five 
“accountability” indicators to determine what environment foreign aid is dependent on for positive growth.  
 This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background information on the history of aid in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Section III reviews the literature of the effect of foreign aid on economic 
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growth. Section IV discusses the conceptual framework of the study. Section V presents the sample data used. 
Section VI shows the empirical results, and Section VII concludes and provides recommendations for policy 





















 The United States has provided foreign aid programs in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 
1940s; however, funding was minimal until the early1960s with the rise of communism and strategic interests in 
the region. Economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean has generally remained “volatile and modest” 
since the 1960s (De Gregorio 2006). Yet, the 1980s can be remembered for the debt crisis and severely 
depressing growth rates in the region as compared to the rest of the world. The economies of the region in the 
1990s and the start of the 21
st
 century showed some improvements yet remained sluggish, unstable, and 
sustained growth proved to be elusive. In 2002, the average rate of growth of GDP per capita was 1.6 percent 
over the last forty-two years (Solimano and Soto 2005).  Recently, the outlook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean shows promise even in the face of the global recession; however, growth performances have not yet 
reached the growth rate levels of the 1960s and 1970s and remain well below those observed in Asia, the 
Middle East, and Eastern Europe.  
 Latin America and the Caribbean also suffer from high-income inequality. In fact, it is notorious for 
being the most inequitable region in the world. Ten of the world‟s fifteen most unequal countries are in Latin 
America. The richest 20 percent of the population accounted for around 60 percent of the region's income, while 
the poorest 20 percent received around 3 percent (World Bank 2010). Stephen Haber finds that Latin America 
suffers exorbitantly from crony capitalism. He states that countries that lack limited governments, or those with 
weak institutions of accountability, choose to protect property rights and thus increase investments through 
guaranteeing a credible commitment to a few, the elite. Economic growth can occur through elites‟ investments 
because these elites can gain a monopoly and thus, have the capability to charge excessive prices to the 
underprivileged sections of the population. However, this „crony capitalism‟ has dismal effects on the 
distribution of income as can be seen in the region‟s income inequality (Haber 2002).  
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 Poverty is also a problem. Despite upward trends in poverty reduction for some countries in Latin 
America, over one-third of the population (over 190 million people) live below national poverty lines. Over 17 
percent of the population of Latin America lives on less than US$2 a day. In Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua more than 40 percent of the population live on less than US$3 per day (IBRD 2010). 
Inflation also increased in 2008 and reached an estimated 8.9% during that year, which increased from 6.5% in 
2007 (World Bank 2010).  
 Despite these bleak observations, the International Monetary Fund and other bilateral agencies have 
poured an incredible amount of aid into the region. Worldwide aid flows have currently reached their highest 
disbursement levels. In 2008 “total net official development assistance (ODA) from members of the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) rose by 
10.2% in real terms to USD 119.8 billion, which is the highest dollar figure ever recorded "(OECD/WTO 2009, 
p. 23).  
 The Economic Survey of Latin American and the Caribbean 2009-2010 showed some positive trends. 
The highest growth rates in 2010 were in South America, led by the biggest economy in the region, Brazil, 
which grew to 7.6%, followed by Uruguay (7.0%), Paraguay (7.0%), Argentina (6.8%) and Peru (6.7%). Other 
countries in the region held lower growth rates such as the Dominican Republic (6.0%), Panama (5.0%), Bolivia 
(4.5%), Chile (4.3%) and Mexico (4.1%). Those exhibiting poor performances were Colombia (3.7%), Ecuador 
and Honduras (2.5%), Nicaragua and Guatemala (2.0%). Venezuela experienced negative growth (-3.0%), and 
Haiti fell to (-8.5%) (ECLAC 2009).  
 Does this mean that foreign aid helps in any way? Possibly. The literature on aid-growth relationships 
shows conflicting results, with the negative aid-growth studies dominating the field. However, this analysis 
seeks to understand under what conditions foreign aid can become effective.   
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III. Literature Review 
  The literature on the determinants of economic growth is vast. Literature on foreign aid‟s effect 
on economic growth is less prevalent yet still somewhat substantial. However, decades of study have failed to 
come up with conclusive evidence of a direct relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. Even 
though there is a large literature on foreign aid and economic growth, there has not been much progress in 
coming to any hard conclusions. Some argue that aid positively contributes to growth (Burnside and Dollar 
2000; Collier and Dehn 2001; and Hansen and Tarp 2000), while others maintain that there is no statistically 
significantly relationship between aid and growth; and still others assert that aid negatively affects economic 
growth (Mosley 1980; Boone 1996; Easterly 2003; Islam 2003; Easterly 2004). However, it is clear that public 
policies and institutions can indeed affect the rate of economic growth.  
Positive Aid-Growth Relationships 
 The most groundbreaking study to date on the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth 
was and still remains Burnside and Dollar‟s “Aid, Growth, and Policies” written in 2000. Examining fifty-six 
countries from several regions over a twenty-three year timeframe, Burnside and Dollar concluded that foreign 
aid‟s impact on economic growth and development was positive and statistically significant when interacted 
with each country‟s fiscal policy index. Their results showed that those countries with “good” fiscal, monetary, 
and trade policies were best suited to convert foreign aid into economic growth (Burnside and Dollar 2000). 
They described „good policy‟ as low inflation, low budget deficits with an open trade regime, a liberalized 
financial sector, and a private sector friendly government. The results indicate that increasing the conditionality 
of aid on policies enhances the effectiveness of aid. Julian Simon (1987) points out that several other scholars 
have found the conditionality of aid on policies to be statistically significant when including a multitude of 
additional explanatory variables or substituting Burnside and Dollars‟ fiscal policy variable with the World 
Bank‟s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. 
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 Hansen and Tarp (2001) study the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in real GDP 
per capita by finding correlations with popular cross-country growth determinants. Their results show that aid 
does increase the growth rate. However, this finding surprisingly is not conditional on “good” policy as 
mentioned in Burnside and Dollar‟s study. They also find that there are decreasing returns to aid, in other 
words, the effect of additional aid will decline as aid amounts continue to grow. Another surprising result in the 
study showed that the approximate effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of the statistical method 
used and the set of control variables. 
  A study investigating the effect of foreign aid on economic freedom and growth concluded that aid does 
not significantly increase economic freedom by and large; however, it is instrumental in policy formation and 
creating and sustaining institutional environments favorable to growth (Heckelman and Knack 2008).  
 Another study investigating the types of economic growth financed by foreign aid also found a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between aid and sector-specific economic growth. Unfortunately, the 
significance of aid was lost when interacted with the fiscal policy index variable created in the 2000 Burnside 
and Dollar study (Feeny and Outtara 2009). 
 Dowling and Hiemenz (1982) studied the effect of foreign aid on economic growth in the Asian 
continent to understand the miracle of economic growth in the region. They used a sample of thirteen Asian 
countries receiving a considerable amount of aid. After controlling for the effect of several variables such as 
trade, finance, and government intervention, they found that aid does have a positive and significant effect on 
economic growth.  
 Similarly, Levy (1988) studied the effect of aid in a sample of low-income Sub-Saharan African 
countries from 1968 to 1982 and found that aid is positively and significantly correlated with investment and 
economic growth. 
 Using a variety of samples and different econometric models, Durbarry, Gemmell, and Greenaway 
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(1998) studied the effect of aid, focusing on the most favorable amount of aid that would produce economic 
growth instead of diminishing returns. They found solid evidence that aid would boost economic growth. They 
assert that there is in fact an optimal level of aid that should be given to developing countries to generate 
economic growth. In those countries utilizing good macroeconomic policies, around 40% to 45% of foreign aid 
as a percentage of GDP would allow recipient countries to generate favorable economic growth.  
Negative Aid-Growth Relationship 
 Unlike the aforementioned studies, this section identifies those studies that found aid to negatively 
impact recipient economies, usually through the creation or promotion of dependency or corruption (Papanek 
1972; Brautigam and Knack 2004; Malik 2008). Corruption has been found to be a major obstruction for 
economic growth (Mauro 1995). It causes uneven distribution of resources, decreases foreign direct investments 
and private investment in both human and capital resources, increases transaction costs, distorts free market 
incentives, and reduces economic efficiency (Gyimah and Camacho 2006). 
 A 2004 study argued that foreign aid creates incentives for the continuance of weak institutions and non-
accountability in recipient countries (Brautigam and Knack 2004). These incentives often lead to increased 
levels of corruption and dependence, which translate into decreased government efficiency and economic 
growth. 
 Angeles and Neanidis analyzed the role played by the elite classes in aid effectiveness of recipient 
nations and discovered historical factors of nations, especially those which fostered the advancement of certain 
groups in the population over another, were associated with the misuse of aid dollars (Angeles and Neanidis 
2009). 
 Additionally, Wolfgang Kasper argued that during the past 50 years, the colossal amount of foreign aid 
estimated at USD 1 trillion given to sub-Saharan African countries had not yet produced any significant effect 
on economic growth. Furthermore, corruption impeded the economic growth of virtually all recipient countries 
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in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kasper 2006).    
  A United Nations study in 1994 found that income in some aid recipient countries had literally fallen. 
This study looked at over one hundred countries that had received aid during 1970 to 1994. The results were 
surprising. During the 1990s, seventy countries within the sample had average incomes lower than their average 
during the 1980s and forty-three countries had average incomes lower than their average during the 1970s 
(Vasquez 1998). 
 Aside from just topics of corruption, several authors further examined this seemingly illogical result of 
negative aid growth. Constantin Voivodas conducted one of the earliest studies of the effect of aid on economic 
growth. Voivodas found that for a sample of twenty-two under-developed countries from 1956 to 1968, aid had 
a negative impact on economic growth (Voivodas 1973). Nonetheless, these results have proven over time to be 
somewhat inaccurate due to poor quality of his data and the limited econometric techniques available during the 
early 1970s. 
 Later studies examining the effects of aid on economic growth found distinctions between long and 
short-term economic growth. Many theorists in this group believe economic growth occurs in the presence of 
aid over a short time period. However, it is noted that long-term negative impacts greatly overshadow most 
short-term gains, thus making the overall impact of aid on economic growth a depressing outcome (Lockwood 
1990; Duc 2006;and Malik 2008). Large foreign aid inflows also affect the real exchange rate of dependent 
countries and undermine the competitiveness of their export sector. This occurrence is often called the „Dutch 
disease‟ (Rajan and Subramanian 2005). Dutch disease-type effects have been noted in a number of African aid 
recipients (Younger 1992). 
 Peter Boone (1994) also finds that aid has not raised any growth rates in developing countries either. He 
conducted a study of the effect of aid on ninety-seven countries over a period of twenty-nine years and 
discovered aid does not have any positive effect in any element that promotes economic growth such as human 
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and capital resources or domestic investments.  
 An interesting study done by William Easterly in 2004 reexamined the results of Burnside and Dollar‟s 
pivotal research with the same model specifications and econometric techniques using more elaborate data. 
With a sample covering a timeframe from 1970 to 1997 (four years longer than the sampled used by Burnside 
and Dollar), Easterly uncovered evidence that aid does not promote economic growth, even in good policy 
environments (Easterly 2004). 
 Keefer and Knack (2000) investigated whether foreign aid and institutional quality have any 
relationship. Quality of governance is defined by the authors as bureaucratic quality, the level of corruption, and 
rule of law. The results show higher aid levels reduce the quality of institutions, in particular, recipient countries 
that are dependent on large amounts of foreign aid have low levels of accountability, have more rent-seeking 
opportunities, prevent talented people from entering the bureaucracy, and reduce pressure for reforming 
inefficient policies and institutions. 
 Brautigam (2004) also showed the weakening effect of large aid quantities on governance quality in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. She revealed that large-scale aid provides little encouragement for the country to improve 
its governance quality, thus creating soft budget constraints and more rent-seeking opportunities. Further, she 
proved that aid would increase corrupt activities. Aid dependence thus leads to circumstances in which 
bureaucrats are often not rewarded for staying true to their main developmental functions but rather on gaining 
money from donors.  
No Aid-Growth Relationship 
 Neutral growth studies have often been prevalent in the literature on aid-growth relationships. One study 
focusing on the impact of aid on economic growth even with the inclusion of “bad” economic policies, found no 
significant results to affirm either a positive or negative relationship between aid and economic growth 
(Schwalbenberg 1998). 
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 One of the first studies to conclude that aid had no impact on economic growth was published by Peter 
Boone in 1996. His analysis of the politics and effectiveness of foreign aid found that while aid was responsible 
for increasing government size, it had no impact on investment, growth, or human development indicators 
(Boone 1996).  
 A study comparing the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and official development 
assistance (ODA) on poverty reduction concluded that while NGO aid had a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with poverty reduction, ODA had no effect on poverty reduction or income inequality (Masud and 
Yontcheva 2005). These results were based largely on the fact that NGOs have the capabilities to speedily 
commit to addressing practical issues surrounding social inequalities.  
 A 2001 study investigating the impact of aid on growth concluded that once the outliers are removed 
from the population sample, aid has no impact upon economic growth (Dalgaard and Hansen 2001). A follow-
up study performed three years later added a variable to account for the geographic location of developing 
countries. Their results showed that the relationship between aid and growth in countries situated in the tropics 
was non-existent (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp 2004).  
 Nonetheless, some scholars still assert that the lack of a relationship between foreign aid and economic 
growth does not deny the possibility of such an existence. They believe institutional and policy reform of 
receiving countries has the ability to foster a positive aid-growth relationship (Barro 1991; 2000). 
Literary Contribution 
 My contribution to the literature mentioned above focuses on institutional development, in particular 
those institutions that promote accountability and its ability to increase aid‟s effectiveness on economic growth. 
For the most part, economists have largely ignored a long tradition in the political science literature, which 
establishes an historical connection between each country‟s level of economic development and its political and 
institutional attributes. And political scientists have largely ignored the political repercussions caused by foreign 
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aid, especially in developing countries where foreign aid is the leading component of economic activity and also 
is thought to have a very real and very significant impact on their political economies. The critical importance 
of good institutions to the development process is gaining acceptance in general opinion, not only among 
political scientists but also among economists (Rodrik 2003; Acemoglu et al. 2004). Jeffrey Sachs‟ (2005) 
analysis stating that good institutions are on the whole a result of economic development, instead of its cause, is 
now a pariah. 
  Aid is thought to work best in environments with high quality institutions, as part of an efficient 
developmental state (Burnside and Dollar 2000). As it so happens, measures of institutional quality such as the 
presence of property rights, the risk of expropriation, and bureaucratic quality are becoming a determining 
factor for aid disbursement, especially in the fairly recent formation of the Millennium Challenge Account. 
Thus, „institutional quality‟ is routinely specified as an independent variable thought to affect the efficiency of 
aid, and consequently a decisive factor in selecting aid recipients. This is a timely addition to foreign aid 
allocation strategies. In Africa and in other developing states, political leaders have relied on wholesale neo-
patrimonialism and of utilizing state resources for political ends. As a result, government resources, including 
development assistance funds, have not been employed properly to promote economic development. Ultimately, 
these political elites have acted in an exploitative manner to keep themselves in power. 
  In political systems where institutions of accountability are slack or non-existent, large continuous aid 
flows will essentially alter the relationship between government leaders and the constituents. When donor 
countries are providing large quantities of aid and these recipient governments are only accountable to those 
donors, it may not be possible to also expect a committed social contract to develop between the state apparatus 
and its constituents. In political systems where accountability structures are diminished, leaders and bureaucrats 
no longer need to acquire and maintain the support of their constituents or the approval of their legislatures 
when they receive unearned income in the form of foreign aid. They do not need to raise revenues through 
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taxation from the local population (Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2006). Foreign aid can also create low 
institutional quality because it lessens the motivations to adopt good policies and reform inefficient institutions, 
and in the end, weakens the government‟s developmental performance and encourages corruption and 
clientelism (Heller and Gupta 2002). North and Weingast (1989) show that the currently developed countries 
were better able to grasp institutions of democracy and accountability because of their capabilities to create 
accountability structures in the past. The emergence of parliamentary sovereignty in Britain in 1688 increased 
the ability of the government to raise taxes, and enhanced militaristic and economic success in the 18th and 19th 
century. Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle (2006) argue that political systems with stronger traditions of both 
vertical and horizontal accountability are more positively affected by the allotment of foreign aid in regard to 
the African continent.  
 Consequently, there are many similarities between Africa and Latin America: both have a history of 
strong presidential rule and weak legislatures. In regard to Latin America, many countries have grasped this 
idea of accountability and reformed their poor institutions by improving the rule of law and increasing 
democracy. Essentially, in democracies, the executive must gain the support of critical members of the ruling 
party, legislature, and sometimes judiciary before the executive-favored policy can be put into practice. To 
further constrain the executive, the citizenry also influences the outcome through participation in elections. 
Elections provide a strong motivation for leaders to be sensitive toward the interests of the general population or 
else they will be voted out of office. These institutions of accountability help check decision-making in 
democracies.  
 What then creates democracies‟ overall developmental success? Many democracies produce stronger 
institutions of accountability, an independent media, and rule of law than any other political system. And time 
after time, these institutions turn out positive social and economic results. Low-income democracies with 
stronger systems of accountability have annual economic growth rates that are 60% greater than democracies 
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with weaker systems of accountability. What is more, autocracies that have stronger accountability institutions 
as opposed to other autocracies grow 30% more rapidly (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein 2005).  
 Donor countries interested in improving effective development strategies should staunchly commit to 
analyzing the level of accountability within a government before dispensing foreign aid. The stronger the 
institutions of political accountability are in a given country, the greater the incentives for leaders to enact 
policies that agree with the preferences of the citizenry when there is indeed a general consensus. Idealistically, 
donor states as well as organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD should be evaluating each country 
individually and giving the biggest share of development assistance to those governments that are reforming 
and adhering to accountability structures.  
 Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein (2005) argue that many donors have implemented policies mentioned 
above giving increased foreign aid to countries with “good governance” in recent years. However, they confess 
that this generic term is often interpreted to mean a myriad of things such as ideas of economic governance, rule 
of law, or corruption. All of these are important. But they fall short of the central organizing framework that 
institutions of accountability provide. That is the hope of this study; to determine what exactly makes up „good 
governance‟, specifically looking at these particular institutions, so that this generic term can become more 









IV. Conceptual Framework 
 The conceptual framework in this study is motivated by the current and on-going debate on foreign aid‟s 
effectiveness.  However, little work has been done to find the right political environment needed for economic 
growth in the presence of foreign aid. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) argue that scholars excessively 
consider the concept of governance, yet there is still no agreement around a single definition of governance or 
institutional quality. Various definitions are thrown about with no empirical evidence to substantiate such 
claims. They are oftentimes so vague that they can mean almost anything, including rules, enforcement 
mechanisms, and organizations (World Bank 2002).  
 My hope is to provide the specific and exact framework through which we may better understand the 
conditions necessary for foreign aid to be most efficiently utilized in developing countries‟ economies.  
 This study proposes that the impact of aid is positive, conditional on “good institutional quality”, which 
I believe are the five main indicators of accountability.  According to Burnside and Dollar, the positive impact 
of aid on economic growth is greatest when it is interacted with fiscal policies such as low inflation, budget 
surplus, a fairly liberalized trade environment, and low government consumption; therefore, it is not a stretch to 
hypothesize that it will also be greatest when interacted with institutional quality components. Foreign aid might 
directly impact economies if funds are distributed properly and used as originally planned without misconduct 
(Feeny and Ouattara 2009).  
 The indicators that I believe promote accountability best are executive constraint, an effective 
bureaucracy, large amounts of domestic credit to the private sector, an independent judiciary, and press 
freedom. These indicators provide both vertical and horizontal checks on the individual branches of government 




 This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of executives, whether individuals or collectives. Constraints may be enforced by any 
accountability structure. In most democracies, these are oftentimes legislatures, the ruling party in a one-party 
state, councils of nobles or influential advisors in monarchies, the military in systems where coups are 
predominant, and/or a strong, independent judiciary (Polity IV 2009). These structures are assigned with the 
duty of checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making apparatus. The executive branch 
in Latin America is predominantly an inheritance of colonial Iberian institutions. Less constrained executives 
have more power to act in their short time horizons and also have the possibility to hurt the state‟s economy by 
pursuing selfish or patrimonial activities. Latin American executives seek to keep their jobs for as long as 
possible. However, unlike in American politics, the duration of incumbency is not definite due to frequent 
political upheaval. As a result, executives in Latin America take special measures to establish a base of support 
that will perpetuate their term in office. To form and maintain an alliance of support, they may rely on public 
expenditure to satisfy the base of support, which is inherently bad for economic growth and development 
(Morrison 2007). Here we can see that low levels of executive constraint can influence leaders‟ ability to retain 
as many resources as possible for personal use without endangering their term in office. I expect the coefficient 




 This variable measures the perception of quality of public services, the capacity 
of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, and the quality of policy formulation 
                                  
1
 This indicator is based on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing unlimited executive authority 
 and 7 signifying executive parity or subordination. Appendix A has the definitions for each 
rating. 
2
 The bureaucratic quality index is based on a scale using standard normal units ranging from 
around -2.5 to +2.5, with -2.5 representing low bureaucratic quality and +2.5 the highest. The 
index is based on several aggregate surveys measuring bureaucratic quality.   
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(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). Mauro (1995) finds bureaucratic quality to be a significant indicator in 
his growth equation. The World Bank cites that an improvement in bureaucratic quality by one standard 
deviation as measured by the indicators used in the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi study is associated with 
raising incomes by about three times in the long run, and reduces infant mortality by two thirds (World Bank 
2010). The principal reasons for giving the public sector such a prominent place in this study on accountability 
are the influences of the public sector in the overall economy and because “the functioning of the public sector 
affects the private sector by means of taxation, government spending, and regulations” (van de Walle 2005). I 
hypothesize that economic growth will be higher in those countries that exhibit high bureaucratic quality.  
 Domestic Credit to the Private Sector. This indicator in effect is a financial policy rather than a political 
institution; however, it serves as proxy for the extent of central bank independence or rather supervisory 
capacities of the banking system. If a bank is state-owned, then we should see low levels of domestic credit 
given to the private sector and higher levels given to public sector development. It measures the quality and 
quantity of the investment financed by the banking sector and shows banking sector development. The existing 
indices of central bank independence do not provide current data or information regarding developing countries. 
Domestic credit given to the private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such as 
through loans and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment as a percentage of GDP (World 
Bank 2010). Private markets drive economic growth, utilizing strategies and investment to create productive 
jobs and raise incomes. In state-owned banking systems, non-commercial provisions may overtly influence 
credit allocation to the public sector. Political power and economic opportunity are too often synonymous. This 
indicator isolates credit issued to the private sector from credit issued to governments, government agencies, 
and public enterprises. Also, financial systems can help monitor managers and exert corporate controls, which 
reduce the principal-agent problems that lead to inefficient investment and poor economic growth. Excessive 
government borrowing will usually be balanced out by a credit squeeze, which then leads to the reduction in 
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private sector credit (Fry 1998). Therefore, increasing the amount of domestic credit given to the private sector 
rather than to the public sector should increase economic growth. Levine et al. (2000) show a robust positive 
relationship between domestic credit to the private sector and the growth rate of GDP per capita. 
 Independent Judiciary. The simple logic here is that citizens should feel confident that the government 
will not be able to influence the judiciary, that the judiciary is truly independent. Once citizens are convinced of 
this, they will feel secure enough to make more investments. The judiciary helps ensure that the government is 
under the rule of law. An independent judiciary can be thought of as a mechanism for turning promises into 
credible commitments such as ensuring property rights and protection from expropriation, which then leads to 
an environment favorable to citizen‟s investments in physical capital and to a higher degree of specialization 
(Lucius and Plekovic 2003). Feld and Voigt (2003) find that while de jure judicial independence does not have 
an impact on economic growth, de facto judicial independence positively influences real GDP per capita growth 
within a sample of fifty-six countries. Determining independence of the judiciary is represented by the CIRI 
Human Rights Score. This score is based on the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from 
another branch of the government or the military. A score of 0 indicates “not independent”, a score of 1 
indicates “partially independent” and a score of 2 indicates “independent”.  I, therefore, speculate that a higher 
score on the CIRI Index will provide successful economic growth. 
 Press Freedom. This variable acknowledges how free the mechanisms of communication of a state are. 
Press freedom is crucial to sustaining and monitoring accountability. The media is the most effective form of 
inspection on governments. Most autocratic societies utilize state-run news organizations to promote the 
propaganda vital to maintaining an existing political power core and to stamp out any significant attempts by 
the media or individuals to question the decisions and actions of the government especially on heated issues. 
Most importantly, press freedoms provide an outlet for citizens to enact vertical accountability. Development 
scholars have long acknowledged the role mass media play in communication and development. Cross-national 
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studies of the relationships among political freedom, economic freedom, and economic growth and well-being 
have been reported in the literature for a quarter century. The variable representing press freedom is based on 
the Freedom of the Press Index published by Freedom House. In the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
covered in this study, the scale ranges from 4 to 96. The Press Freedom index ranks countries on a scale of 0 to 
100, with 0 representing the highest press freedom and 100 the absolute lowest.
3
 To avoid confusion and create 
a cohesive index, I reverse the scale and generate a variable measured so that high scores represent higher levels 
of press freedom. 
Hypothesis  
 Drawing on all five indicators mentioned above my overall hypothesis is:  
 H1: Foreign aid has a positive impact on economic growth when it is interacted with institutional  









                                  
3
 The index is based on a scale of 0 to 100, with a score of 0 to 30 placing the country in the free 
press group; 31 to 60 in the partly free press group; and 61 to 100 in the not free press group. See 
Appendix A for the questions used to create the Press Freedom Index.  
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V. Data 
 This paper utilizes data accessed from the World Bank, the Polity IV Dataset, CIRI Human Rights 
Database, World Governance Indicators, and Freedom House. The dataset used in this analysis records the 
social, economic, and political trends of Latin America and the Caribbean from 1996 to 2008. This time frame 
is conducive to current studies as previous literature extends research only up to the mid 1990s. Table 1 
categorizes the data by organization, database name, description, and number of variables.  
 TABLE 1. Breakdown of Information and Characteristics of Each Database 
 
Organization Database Name Description Variables 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators 
Economic and    
Demographic              
Indicators (Annual) 
9 





Cingranelli & Richards 
Dataset 
International Human     
Rights Dataset 
Independence of the    
Judiciary Indicators    
(Annual) 
1 




Freedom House Freedom of the Press         
and World 
Civil Liberties and          






 The Pooled Cross Section Time Series Model using the generalized least squares random effects 
estimator will be used to examine the relationship between economic growth, institutional quality, and foreign 
aid.  The assumption is that economic growth is positively correlated with foreign aid, conditional on the 
institutional quality of the recipient nation. This technique is characterized by having repeated observations on 
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fixed units, which means that the pooled data analysis combines cross-sectional data on N spatial units and T 
time periods to produce a data set of N ×T observations (Podesta 2000). Using this model is advantageous 
because it allows for the capability “to capture not only the variation of what emerges through time or space, but 
the variation of these two dimensions simultaneously” (Podesta, 2000, p. 9).  
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in this study is the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate adjusted for 
inflation or deflation. The GDP growth rate is the most important indicator of economic health (World Bank 
2010). If GDP is growing, other sectors of a society will flourish such as personal income, business 
investments, and increased employment. If GDP decreases or stagnates, then businesses will hold off investing 
in new purchases and hiring new employees, which further weakens the economy.  
Independent Variables 
  The independent variables in this study are foreign aid and the five main institutions of accountability 
mentioned above. Aid is represented by net Official Development Assistance (ODA) per capita for each 
country. ODA “consists of disbursements of loans and grants by official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote 
economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients” (World Bank 
2010). ODA excludes all military assistance. Foreign aid given in a developmental package has every hope and 
theoretical basis on uplifting economies; therefore, this variable should increase the GDP growth rate – ceteris 
paribus. The five institutions of accountability are combined into an index using factor analysis and should also 
increase economic growth. 
4
 The interaction term is foreign aid in the form of Official Development Assistance 
and the accountability index combined.  
                                  
4
 See Appendix B for Descriptive Statistics on the Accountability Index. 
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 The literature on economic growth determinants is extensive. To isolate the effect of my independent 
variables, I control for other factors including civil liberties, gross secondary school enrollment, government 
consumption, energy use per capita, trade openness, population growth rate, initial GDP, inflation rate, and the 
polity score.  
 Initial GDP. This indicator is often used in economic studies to show conditional convergence, which 
theorizes that poor countries should grow faster than rich ones due to diminishing returns to factors of 
production. This theory is measured by real gross domestic product lagged by one year (1995). It provides a 
control for the initial position of the economy.  
 International Trade Openness. Trade no doubt affects economic growth and it usually affects it in a 
favorable manner. It allows for increased specialization, which then allows countries to gain from their own 
unique advantages. Trade liberalization also minimizes the incentives for businesses to conduct corrupt rent-
seeking activities. Usually the indicator used for prior research is Jeffry Sachs‟ and Andrew Warner‟s index of 
trade openness policy, which takes into account average tariff rates, non-tariff barriers, black market exchange 
rates, and the availability of export marketing committees (Sachs and Warner 1995). However, this index only 
extends to 1992 and falls quite short of the time frame for this analysis. I use instead the volume of trade (real 
exports plus imports) over GDP.  
 Inflation. Because Latin America suffers from some of the worst inflation rates in the world, it was 
important to include such a control. High inflation rates lead to more modest investments, which then leads to 
economic decline. Inflation may also reduce a country‟s overall competitiveness, creating expensive exports. It 
also has a negative effect on the value of money. Broadly speaking, inflation, if in excess, hurts any economy. 
The inflation rate is measured annually as the rate of change of prices for a given country.  
 Government Burden. Inasmuch as government expenditures are spent for social programs such as 
health, education, and the police, many expenditures are not utilized in such a manner. Instead, the government 
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may consume large quantities of revenue for unproductive activities such as paying off the bureaucracy‟s wage 
bill (Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderon 2004). Therefore, I speculate that economic growth should decrease in 
the presence of heightened government spending. To measure the burden of government, I use government 
revenues as percent of GDP.  
 Education and Human Capital. This indicator is also utilized in many studies on economic growth. 
Education and human capital can control the amount of technological innovations in a given country. Lucas 
(1998) discovered that human capital is conducive to long-term economic growth by offsetting diminishing 
returns. In this study, I go along with Lucas‟ study and predict that education and human capital is conducive to 
economic prosperity. I use the rate of gross secondary school enrollment as a measurement for the amount of 
human capital available.  
 Another important indicator is the availability of public services and infrastructure. This indicator can 
be seen in many economic growth models (Barro 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992) and is usually positively 
correlated with long-term economic growth. Public services and infrastructure are good growth determinants 
because they are used as “inputs of the production function, by serving to improve total factor productivity, and 
by encouraging private investment through property rights protection” (Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderon 2004, 
p. 23).  Many studies use different avenues of public services such as kilometers of paved road per capita or the 
number of main telephone lines per capita; however, I use megawatts of electricity used per capita and believe it 
to be most crucial for increased productivity.  
 Democracy.
5
 Despite numerous studies on the subject of political regimes and economic growth, a 
direct relationship remains elusive. Some studies maintain the idea that democracies are associated with higher 
human capital accumulation, lower inflation, political stability, and economic freedom. Yet, there is also 
                                  
5
 I use the Polity IV Dataset‟s Polity Score, which ranges from -10 to +10, where -10 represents 
“strongly autocratic” and 10 “strongly democratic”. The Polity Score is generated by subtracting 
the AUTOCRACY score from the DEMOCRACY score of a given country.  
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evidence that democracies are associated with larger, more corrupt governments and more restrictions on trade. 
Democracies also may be more defenseless against citizens‟ demands for re-distribution and equality while 
authoritarian regimes can impose fiscal and social policies needed for economic growth. In East Asia, the key to 
economic success was, as mentioned by many scholars, due to the insulation from interest groups and unions 
provided by state autonomy, which is possible only under authoritarianism. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) 
conclude that they do not know whether or not democracy weakens economic growth. However, they do argue 
that there is some scraps of evidence that political institutions matter. In this study, I speculate democracies 
have a more favorable chance at promoting economic development.  
 Civil Liberties. These are an expansive and broad group of personal rights as well as avenues of well-
being. These rights are basic such as the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from slavery, the right to 
liberty and security, right to a fair trial, the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and 
association, and the right to marry and have a family. Studies are once again inconclusive on the direct 
relationship between civil liberties and economic growth. However, I speculate that more civil liberties will 
increase economic development through more investments, trust in government, less conflict, and so on. The 




 Population Growth Rate. Some optimistic scholars assume that population growth encourages 
economic growth by increasing the tax pool and potential work force. On the other hand, these rewards may not 
outweigh the resulting escalation in urban sprawl, traffic congestion, and loss of open space. Also, the amount 
of basic requirements of life such as food and water cannot expand as rapidly as some areas experiencing rapid 
population growth rates. Population growth in this study is assumed to have a negative impact on economic 
                                  
6
 See Appendix A for index definitions. 
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growth because it reduces family savings rates and creates difficulties in the government‟s capabilities to 
provide basic services to a growing population.  
Data Limitations 
 Pooled cross sectional time-series analysis tends to have some complications involved such as 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity means that errors may have differing variances across 
ranges or sub sets of nations. Autocorrelation is a complication that involves errors at one time period being 
correlated with first lag of the errors at the next time period. However, STATA version 11 provides commands 
to correct such problems: corr(psar1) panels(h) force. The first command corrects first order autocorrelation 
and also calculates the estimate of the autocorrelation function separately for each country. The second 
command corrects heteroskedasticity, and the last command forces STATA to provide model estimates even if 











VI. Empirical Results 
 The results of all five models are surprisingly inconsistent with the hypothesis that the impact of foreign 
aid on economic growth is conditional on the institutional environment, specifically an accountable 
environment, in Latin America and the Caribbean. The direction of the relationship between aid and growth are 
positive; however, the strength is unexpectedly weak. Unfortunately, when the accountability index is added, 
the statistically significant variable negatively affects overall GDP growth.  
 Table 2 and 3 show the model estimation results. Table 2 analyzes the effect of an accountability index 
and the interaction term on economic growth without fixed effects. Table 3 analyzes the effect of an 
accountability index and the interaction term with fixed effects. For the most part, economic growth decreases 
when governments do not carry out policies conducive to economic stability.  
 Trade Openness. The coefficient for the level of trade openness variable is positive and as expected 
shows an overall increase in economic growth, yet only in the fixed effects model is the variable significant.  
Holding constant all other growth determinants, countries with more liberalized trade strategies prospered more 
than those without. The direction of the relationship is positive and statistically significant in four of the five 
estimation models.  
 Inflation Rate. When all other factors are held constant, the statistical significance of the inflation rate 
variable indicates that a one-unit increase in the inflation rate as a whole results in a 0.046 to 0.072 percent 
decrease in the economic growth rate. High inflation rates do seem to decrease economic growth overall. It is 
also consistent and positive in all five models. This is crucial evidence that Latin American and Caribbean 
should reform economic policies to lower inflation rates as it is a significant determinant of growth.  
 Population Growth. The estimated coefficient of this variable is curiously positive, is one of the 
strongest indicators in the model without fixed effects, and is statistically significant. However, in the more 
stringent model accounting for fixed effects, the coefficient is negative and not significant at all. This would 
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seem that an elevated population growth rate may increase the opportunities for economic development and 
may indeed do so by creating a large tax base for increased revenues.  
 Secondary School Enrollment. The coefficients in both models representing a population with higher 
education are inconclusive due to the fact that economic growth increases with improvements in education in 
one model and decreases in another. However, the estimates are statistically significant and show a decrease in 
GDP growth with the more stringent model with fixed effects.  
 Government Consumption. Like the other economic determinants, such as trade openness and inflation, 
this variable performs well and consistently in all five models. When all factors are held constant, a one unit 
increase in government consumption results in a 0.198 to 0.693 percent decrease in the economic growth rate. 
As expected, when governments do not allocate resources and funds properly, development and prosperity 
suffers. 
 Public Infrastructure. The coefficients for the energy usage per capita variable is positive yet miniscule 
and not at all statistically significant in all five models. Public infrastructure in the form of the amount of energy 
used is not a telling determinant for economic growth in the region. 
 Civil Liberties. This variable performs the way it was originally hypothesized in every model. With or 
without fixed effects, higher levels of civil liberties increase economic growth. The civil liberties score ranges 
from 1 (the highest form of civil liberties) to 7 (the lowest). Therefore, a negative coefficient was anticipated.  
 Conditional Convergence. The coefficient on the initial level of GDP per capita is negative and 
statistically insignificant. However, this implies that there is some kind of “conditional convergence;” that is, 
holding constant other growth determinants, poorer countries may grow faster than richer ones due to 
diminishing returns of production. 
 Democracy. The polity score coefficient in both models is highly significant and positive as expected. 
That is democracies have a heightened ability to increase economic growth; however, it seems that its 
 29 
capabilities for accountability are not the determining factor. It may be due to its propensities for lower inflation 
rates, political stability, and economic freedom. 
 When the interaction term is added to check for the conditionality of economic growth on foreign aid 
and the index measuring institutional variables, aid shows no significant effect on economic growth. These 
results are inconsistent with those found in the Burnside and Dollar study (2000). Burnside and Dollar conclude 
that the impact of aid on economic growth is truly conditional on the policy environment of each individual 
country. The results from all five models show the non-statistically significant relationship between foreign aid 
and economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. These results remain unchanged when the 
accountability index and foreign aid and interaction term variables are included into the equation, as seen in 
Table 2 and 3. 
 To check the robustness of my accountability index, I replaced the index with each of its component 
parts separately, namely, the indicators on bureaucratic quality, press freedom, executive constraint, 
independence of the judiciary, and the amount of domestic credit given to the private sector as can be seen in 
Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
7
 
 The model representing the disaggregation of the accountability index offers some similarities to the 
other models. Official Development Assistance offers once again a positive, miniscule, yet statistically 
insignificant relationship with economic growth. Additionally, once the fixed effects are added in the model the 





      
                                  
7
 See Appendix B for the results of each individual variable. 
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates for Pooled Cross Section Time Series Models of Economic Growth in Latin American Countries Including the 
Accountability Index With Fixed Effects, 1996 to 2008. 
Additive Model Without Fixed Effects   Multiplicative Model Without Fixed Effects 
          
Variable   b Z   Variable   b z   
Intercept  0.846 0.41  Intercept  1.161 0.52  
          
Developmental Assistance (+)  0.003 0.44  Developmental Assistance (+) 0.002 0.34  
Accountability Index (+)  -1.108 -3.08***  Accountability Index (+)  -1.002 -2.30**  
Trade Openness (+)  0.011 1.35  Interaction (ODA*Index) (+) -0.001 -0.17  
Inflation Rate (-)  -0.046 -1.89*  Trade Openness (+)  0.011 1.34  
Population Rate (-)  1.130 3.54***  Inflation Rate (-)  -0.043 -1.76*  
Secondary School Enrollment (+)  0.035 1.94*  Population Rate (-)  0.983 2.63***  
Government Consumption (-)  -0.198 -2.81***  Secondary School Enrollment (+) 0.036 1.86*  
Energy Usage Per Capita (+)  0.001 1.01  Government Consumption (-) -0.197 -2.73***  
Civil Liberties (-)  -0.760 -2.11**  Energy Usage Per Capita (+) 0.0005 0.67  
Initial GDP (-)  -0.0001 -0.30  Civil Liberties (-)  -0.757 -1.98**  
Polity Score (+)  0.344 3.55***  Initial GDP (-)  0.000 -0.18  
     Polity Score (+)  0.324 3.12***  
         
N  246  N  246  
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the annual gross domestic product growth rate.  
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed.  
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 In Tables 3 and 4, the bureaucratic quality variable‟s coefficient points in the right direction; however, is 
only significant in the model without fixed effects. However, it shows that efficiency, competency, and honesty 
are good for economic development in the region for the most part. This variable is the only indicator that 
behaves as speculated but only in Table 4. Under these model estimations, I assume that economic growth 
decreases as the other accountability measures are increased. Independence of the judiciary, increased domestic 
credit to the private sector, and higher press freedoms are statistically significant indicating their ability to stifle 
growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. It would seem that political freedom and institutions providing 
checks and balances are less of a determinant in explaining economic growth. 
 Though lacking any statistical power or consistency across models, those variables classified as 
insignificant are able to provide some explanatory insights; analyses of the direction of coefficient estimates 
indicate if they have the potential negatively or positively to affect economic growth.  
 Gross Secondary School Enrollment. This variable does not consistently affect growth. In Table 4, as 
speculated, economic growth increases as enrollment in higher education grows; however, its impact changes 
directions as fixed effects are added. It would seem that in much of the region, this variable bears hardly any 
weight on economic growth, which is a very odd occurrence. This may lead us to believe that there is an 
underlying problem of measurement or experimental testing for this indicator.  
 Democracy. How democratic a given country is also does not perform consistently. In some models 
democracy affects the economic development of Latin America negatively and, in others, positively. However, 
in Tables 2 and 3, when adding the accountability index, higher democracy scores lead to statistically 
significant increases in economic growth. 
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Table 3. Parameter Estimates for Pooled Cross Section Time Series Models of Economic Growth in Latin American Countries Excluding the 
Accountability Index Without Fixed Effects, 1996 to 2008. 
Additive Model With Fixed Effects   Multiplicative Model With Fixed Effects 
          
Variable   b z   Variable   b z  
Intercept  3.782 1.42  Intercept  2.119 0.87  
          
Developmental Assistance (+)  0.009 1.02  Developmental Assistance (+) 0.009 1.00  
Accountability Index (+)  -2.377 -4.69***  Accountability Index (+)  -2.881 -4.56***  
Trade Openness (+)  0.100 5.84***  Interaction (ODA*Index) (+) 0.016 1.45  
Inflation Rate (-)  -0.072 -2.81***  Trade Openness (+)  0.104 6.03***  
Population Rate (-)  -0.095 -0.11  Inflation Rate (-)  -0.068 -2.64***  
Secondary School Enrollment (+)  -0.054 -2.63***  Population Rate (-)  0.094 0.11  
Government Consumption (-)  -0.693 -5.95***  Secondary School Enrollment (+) -0.056 -2.65***  
Energy Usage Per Capita (+)  0.001 0.74  Government Consumption (-) -0.677 -5.80***  
Civil Liberties (-)  -0.811 -2.56**  Energy Usage Per Capita (+) 0.000 0.59  
Initial GDP (-)  -0.002 -0.81  Civil Liberties (-)  -0.826 -2.56**  
Polity Score (+)  0.579 4.29***  Initial GDP (-)  0.000 0.98  
     Polity Score (+)  0.644 4.68***  
         
N  246  N  246  
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the annual gross domestic product growth rate.  
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed.  
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates for Pooled Cross Section Time Series Models of Economic Growth in Latin 
American Countries Excluding the Accountability Index Without Fixed Effects, 1996 to 2008. 
      Model Without Fixed Effects   
        
Variable      b      z     _________________ 
Intercept      5.697     1.77* 
        
Official Development Assistance (+)   0.001     0.25 
Bureaucratic Quality (+)    1.245     2.10** 
Press Freedom (+)     -0.041     -2.13** 
Executive Constraints (+)     -0.048     -0.13 
Independent Judiciary (+)    -0.638     -1.74* 
Domestic Credit to the 
 Private Sector (+)    -0.540     -2.97*** 
Trade Openness (+)     0.027     2.63*** 
Inflation Rate (-)     -0.042     -1.70* 
Population Rate (-)     0.392     0.75 
Gross Secondary School Enrollment (+)  0.045     2.27** 
Government Consumption (-)    -0.201     -2.81*** 
Energy Usage Per Capita (+)    0.0004     0.69 
Civil Liberties  (-)     -0.436     -1.09 
Initial GDP (-)      -0.0003    -0.89 
Polity Score (+)     0.321     1.90* 
 
N       246                                              
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the annual gross domestic product growth rate.  
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed.  
 
 
 Conditional Convergence. This theory, represented by the lagged initial GDP growth rate variable, is 
highly inconsistent and for the most part, insignificant and minuscule.  
 Population Growth Rate. This variable does not have a statistically significant impact on growth. 







Table 5. Parameter Estimates for Pooled Cross Section Time Series Models of Economic Growth in Latin 
American Countries Excluding the Accountability Index With Fixed Effects, 1996 to 2008. 
      Model With Fixed Effects   
        
Variable          b      z  _________ 
Intercept      12.095     2.32** 
        
Official Development Assistance (+)   0.0003     0.03 
Bureaucratic Quality (+)    1.093     1.50 
Press Freedom (+)     -0.109     -4.46*** 
Independent Judiciary  (+)    -0.618     -1.91* 
Executive Constraints  (+)    -0.310     -0.33 
Domestic Credit to the  
 Private Sector (+)    -0.071     -2.86***     
Trade Openness (+)     0.088     5.35*** 
Inflation Rate (-)     -0.077     -2.99*** 
Population Rate (-)     0.275     0.26 
Gross Secondary School Enrollment (+)  -0.037     -1.32 
Government Consumption (-)    -0.585     -4.36*** 
Energy Usage Per Capita (+)    0.001     0.69 
Civil Liberties  (-)     -0.705     -1.72* 
Initial GDP (-)      0.003       2.41** 
Polity Score (+)     0.564     1.32 
 
N       246                                              
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the annual gross domestic product growth rate.  
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed.  
   
 In Table 6, each individual accountability component and its correlation with economic growth are 
accounted for. The only variables of statistical significance are the amount of domestic credit given to the 
private sector and press freedoms. Inasmuch as an increase in private sector activity and a free media should 
stimulate economic growth, on the whole, they do the opposite in the region. Bureaucratic Quality coefficients 
remain positive yet chronically insignificant. And the rest of the index indicates a negative direction for the 




Summation of Results  
 What does this all mean then? The models show that foreign aid and accountability structures do not 
have any impact on economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, economic factors such as 
increased trade openness, lower inflation rates, and decreased government consumption rates consistently 
perform well across all five models. I would speculate that this region responds well to a strong executive, state 
owned banks, and lower press and political freedoms. Iberian traditions and heritage may explain why this 
region has higher propensities towards the acceptance of a caudillismo culture. In colonial Latin America, the 
Spanish policy was to supplement small troops of professional soldiers with large militia forces recruited from 
local populations to maintain public order. These militiamen were exempt from certain taxes and community 
work assignments and most importantly, exempt from criminal or civil prosecution, which may explain the lack 
of importance of an independent judiciary in the region. Perhaps trust in protection of property rights and 
expropriation comes from ingrained patronage and clientelistic practices in Latin America.  
 What matters the most for economic growth seems to be consistent with Burnside and Dollar‟s 
conclusion that foreign aid only increases economic growth when interacted with good fiscal or monetary 
policies such as trade openness, low government consumption, and low inflation. Here we can see that 
governments that can control inflation rates and increase trade while lowering government consumption are 
better able to increase growth. These countries have smooth economic environments, allocate resources 
efficiently, and maintain strong leadership. Vinod Thomas and Yan Wang in their 1996 study "Distortions, 
Interventions, and Productivity Growth: Is East Asia Different?" speculate government intervention, distortions, 
trade and geographical proximity as possible explanations for East Asian economic performance. They come to 
the conclusion that the most crucial determinant in their miraculous growth was due to their economic policy 
environment. In fact, trade openness and macroeconomic stability were the most important policies and had a 
significant and positive correlation with economic growth in East Asia overall (Thomas and Wang, 1996).  
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 I believe Latin America can benefit from a balance of an authoritarian-style regime as seen in Korea, 
Japan, and Taiwan, which can control fiscal and monetary policies to repress interest rates and direct credit in 
order to increase investments, and a market-friendly economy, which creates avenues for trade openness and 
competitiveness through increased technology as well as stable macroeconomic policies. These policies 
coincide with less government consumption, controlling overspending by the government, which ultimately 
leads to inflation or overvaluation of currency (Thomas and Wang, 1996). Democracy at times can exhibit 
growth inhibiting aspects such as the propensity to redistribute income in systems of majority voting as well as 
the increased role of interest groups in representative legislatures. Nondemocratic governments can occasionally 
prevent such outcomes and yet ensure economic freedom.  
 Robert Barro asserts that most OECD countries encouraged economic development in burgeoning 
systems with limited political rights, then progressed into representative democracies much later (1996). 
Autocracies can prevent economic growth; however, when they pilfer funds for their own use and mismanage 
fiscal and monetary policies.  It is a risky gamble in trusting a nondemocratic regime will enhance economic 
growth, but in many cases, it is the key to success. Of course, another possibility could stem from Seymour 
Lipset‟s (1959) study that economic success encourages democracy, rather the opposite of the democratic 
argument mentioned previously in this study. Lipset believed that only in a society where poverty was 
uncommon could the majority participate in politics responsibly and knowledgeably.  In Barro‟s study, there is 
strong evidence to suggest that Lipset‟s hypothesis is correct. When standard of living measures are increased, 
there seems to be a gradual rise in democracy. On the other hand, democratic governments with low economic 











 The results of this paper hope to better assist with the formation of effective aid policies.  What then 
must be done to improve aid effectiveness in Latin America and the Caribbean? Recently, many donors and aid 
recipients are both actively searching for ways in which to improve aid effectiveness. As we can see from the 
results, foreign aid in the region almost has a nonexistent influence on economic growth rates. However, foreign 
aid may show signs of strength when it is utilized in a system that has “good” fiscal and monetary policies such 
as trade openness, low inflation, and low government consumption. Multilateral organizations such as the 
United Nations and the OECD are researching and implementing several policies designed to enhance economic 
growth and also working with donor nations to better understand how foreign aid can help in actuality and over 
a long term. The Millennium Development Goals and the Paris Declaration stress the importance of the 
recipient‟s duty to actively participate in the process of aid allocation. Also, better understanding the aspects of 
a given country that need improvement such as monetary and fiscal policymaking can help donors inject non-
fungible aid into that specific area with a reduced threat of corruption.  
Future Research 
 Future research should understand that each country in Latin America and the Caribbean is a completely 
different entity and could thus, cause completely different results. Perhaps there is no overarching key to the 
puzzle of aid effectiveness. This is why future research should concern itself less with multi-country studies and 
concentrate more on single case studies. Single case studies can illuminate specific problems a country is 
experiencing which may be based on historical occurrences, ethnic conflicts, and/or natural disasters. Perhaps 
the ambiguity of the results in this paper is due to the aggregation of such similar and dissimilar countries. Also, 
I believe that the research in finding a clear definition for institutional quality should anticipate ambiguity and 
negative results. In finding treasure, one must suffer many obstacles. Research should also continue as 
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databases become more up-to-date. For instance, there is a lack of current databases for central bank planning 
and bureaucratic quality. Newer studies will have the benefit of a wider pool of data. Altogether, continual 
evaluation of aid effectiveness in every recipient country gives us insight on how well foreign aid is working. If 
the negative aid-growth relationship believers are correct, perhaps there should be a massive reform for the 








































“2010 Global Economic Prospects: Fiscal Headwinds and Recovery.” The International Bank for 
 Reconstruction and Development, Washington DC: The World Bank, Vol. 1 Summer 2010.  
 
“Aid for Trade at a Glance 2009: Maintaining Momentum.” Organization for Economic  Cooperation and 
 Development/ World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland: OECD/WTO, 2009.  
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
 Development.” American Economic Review 91 (4): 1369–1401 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
 Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
 117 (1): 1231–1294 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. 2004. “Institutions As the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run 
 Growth.” Handbook of Economic Growth 1(1): 385-472 
 
Angeles, Luis and Kyriako C. Neanidis. 2009. "Aid Effectiveness: the Role of the Local Elite." Journal of 
 Development Economics 90 (1): (2009): 120-134 
 
Barro, Robert J. 1990. “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth." Quarterly Journal 
 of Economics 98(5): 103-125 
 
Barro, Robert. 1991. “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” The Quarterly  Journal of Economics 
 106(2): 407-443 
 
Barro, Robert. 1996. “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study.” National  Bureau 
 of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper 5698, Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
 
Barro, Robert. 2000. “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries.” Journal of Economic Growth 5(1): 5-32 
 
Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1992. "Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth." Review 
 of Economic Studies 59(4): 645-661 
 
Bobba, M. and A. Powell. 2007. “Aid and growth: politics matters.” Inter-American Development Bank 
 Working Paper 601, Washington, DC. 
 
Boone, Peter. 2004. “The Impact of Foreign Aid on Savings and Growth.” Centre for Economic Performance 
 Working Paper 1265. London School of Economics, London. 
 
Boone, Peter. 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid.” European Economic Review 40(2): 289-329 
Brautigam, Deborah A. and Stephen Knack. 2004. “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan  
 Africa.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52(2): 255-286 
 
 41 
Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2000. “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” The American Economic Review 90(4): 
 847-868 
 
 “Building Institutions for Markets.” 2002. World Development Report 2002. The World Bank: World Bank 
 and Oxford University Press.  
 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. Dataset Version 2010. Online: 
 http://www.humanrightsdata.org  
 
Collier, Paul and Jan Dehn. 2001. “Aid, shocks, and growth.” Working Paper 2688. World Bank Policy 
 Research, The World Bank.  
 
Collier, Paul, and David Dollar. 2002. "Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction." European Economic Review 
 46(8): 1475–1500 
 
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp. 2004. “On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth.” 
 Economic Journal 114(1): 191-216 
 
Dalgaard, Carl.-Johan and Henrik Hansen. 2001. “On Aid, Growth, and Good Policies.” Journal  of 
 Development Studies 37(6): 17-41 
 
De Gregorio, Jose. 2006. “Esquema de Metas de Inflación en Economías Emergentes.” Economic Policy 
 Paper 18, Central Bank of Chile.  
 
Dowling, J.M. and U. Hiemenz. 1983. “Aid, savings, and growth in the Asian region.” Developing 
 Economies 21(1): 4-13 
 
Duc, Vu Minh. 2006. “Foreign Aid and Economic Growth in the Developing Countries- A Cross-Country 
 Empirical Analysis.” Discussion Forum, US 
 
Durbarry, Ramesh, Norman Gemmell, and David Greenaway. 1998. “New Evidence on the Impact of 
 Foreign Aid on Economic Growth.” Research Paper 98/8, Centre for Research in Economic 
 Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, England 
 
Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 2001. “It's Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth 
 Models.” The World Bank Economic Review 15(2): 177-219 
 
Easterly, William. 2003. “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(3):  23-48 
 
Easterly, William. 2004. “National Economic Policies and Economic Growth: A Reappraisal." In Handbook of 
 Economic Growth. P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, eds. North-Holland: Elsevier.  
 
Easterly, William, Ross Levine, and David Roodman. 2003. "New Data, New Doubts: A  Comment on 
 Burnside and Dollar's 'Aid, Policies, and Growth' (2000)." American Economic Review 94(3): 774-780 
 
 42 
“ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE CARIBBEAN 2009-2010 FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND MEDIUM-TERM 
 GROWTH.” Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Subregional Headquarters 
 for the Caribbean (ECLAC), United Nations, July 2010.  
 
Fajardo-Heyward, Paolo. 2010. “Easy Money: Military Assistance and Governments‟ Human Rights Practices.” 
 Department of Political Science, Canisius College.  
 
Feeny, Simon and B. Ouattara. 2009. “What Type of Economic Growth Does Foreign Aid Support?” Applied 
 Economics Letters 16(7): 727-730 
 
Feld, Lars P. and Stefan Voigt. 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence 
 using a new set of indicators." European Journal of Political Economy 19(3): 497-527 
 
Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2010. Online: 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010  
 
Freedom House. Freedom of the Press 2010. Online: 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2010  
 
Fry, Maxwell J. 1998. “Assessing Central Bank Independence in Developing Countries: Do Actions Speak 
 Louder than Words?” Oxford Economic Papers 50(1): 512–529 
 
Gupta, K.L., Islam, M.A. 1983. Foreign Capital, Savings and Growth. An International Cross-Section Study. 
 Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena and Samaria M. de Camacho. 2006. “Corruption, growth, and income 
 distribution: Are there regional differences?” Economics of Governance 7(1): 245-269 
 
Haber, Stephen. 2002. Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America. Stanford University: Hoover 
 Press. 
 
Halperin, Morton, Joseph Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. 2005. The democracy advantage: how 
 democracies promote prosperity and peace, New York: Routledge 
 
Hansen, Henrik and Finn Tarp. 2001. "Aid and Growth Regressions.” Journal of Development Economics 
 64(2): 547-570 
 
Heckelman, Jac and Stephen Knack. 2004. "Aid, Economic Freedom, and Growth." Contemporary Economic 
 Policy 27(1): 46-53 
 
Heller, Peter S. and Sanjay Gupta. 2002. “Challenges in Expanding Development  Assistance.”IMF Policy 
 Discussion Paper 02/5, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 
 
Islam, M.A. 2003. “Political regimes and the effect of foreign aid on economic growth.” The Journal of 
 Developing Areas 37(1): 35-53 
 
 43 
Kasper, Wolfgang. 2006. “Make Poverty History: Tackle Corruption” Issue Analysis 67, St. Leonards, 
 Australia: Center for Independent Studies. 
 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2010. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and 
 Analytical Issues.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5430. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack. 2000. "Polarization, politics, and property rights : links between inequality 
 and growth." Public Choice 111 (1-2): 127-154 
 
Knack, Stephen. 2000. “Aid dependence and the quality of governance: A cross-country empirical analysis.” 
 Southern Economic Journal 68(2): 310-329 
 
Kochendörfer-Lucius, Gudrun and Boris Pleskovic. 2003. “Service Provision for the Poor: Public and Private 
 Sector Cooperation.” Berlin Workshop Series, World Bank  Publications. 
 
Levine, Ross, Norman Loayza, and Beck Thorsten. 2000. “Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and 
 Causes” Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (1): 31-77 
 
Levy, Victor. 1988. “Aid and Growth in Sub -Saharan Africa: The Recent Experience.” European Economic 
 Review 32(1): 1777-1795 
 
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and  Political 
 Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53 (1): 69–105 
 
Loayza, Norman, Pablo Fajnzylber, and César Calderón. 2004. “Economic Growth in Latin America and 
 The Caribbean: Stylized facts, Explanations, and Forecasts.” Working Paper 265, Central Bank of Chile. 
 
Malik, Girijasankar. 2008. “Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: A Cointegration Analysis of the  Six Poorest 
 African Countries.” Economic Analysis and Policy 38(2): 251-260 
 
Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2010. “POLITY™ IV PROJECT Political Regime 
 Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 Dataset Users’ Manual.” Center for Systemic Peace 
 www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.  
 
Masud, Nadia and Boriana Yontcheva. 2005. “Does Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty? Empirical Evidence from 
 Nongovernmental and Bilateral Aid.” Working Paper 05/100, Washington: International Monetary Fund 
 
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. “Corruption and Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(1):  681−712 
 
Morrison, Andrea. 2007. "Executive Constraint and Economic Growth in Latin America" Paper presented at 
 the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, IL. 
 




Mosley, Paul, J. Hudson and Sara Horrell. 1987. “Aid, the Public Sector and the Market in Less Developed 
 Countries.” Economic Journal 97(1): 616-41 
 
Moss Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas van de Walle. 2006. “An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review 
 Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Working Paper 74, Washington: 
 Center for Global Development 
 
North, Douglass C. and Barry Weingast. 2000. "Introduction: Institutional Analysis and Economic History." 
 Journal of Economic History 60(2): 414-417 
 
Papanek, Gustav. 1973. “Aid, Foreign Private Investment, Savings, and Growth in Less Developed Countries.” 
 The Journal of Political Economy 81(1): 121-130 
 
Podesta, Federico. 2000. “Recent Developments in Quantitative Comparative Methodology: The  Case of 
 Pooled Time Series Cross Section Analysis.” DSS Papers SOC 3-02.  
  
Polity IV Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009. Dataset Version  2009. Online: 
 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf 
 
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.” The Journal of 
 Economic Perspectives 7(3): 51-69 
 
Rajan, Raghuram, and Arvind Subramanian. 2005.  “What Undermines Aid‟s Impact on Growth?” Working 
 Papers 05/126, Washington: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Rodrik, Dani. 2003. In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth. Princeton, NJ: 
 Princeton University Press. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2005. The End of Poverty. New York: Penguin. 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner. 1995. “Economic reform and the process of economic  integration.” 
 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1(1): 1-53 
 
Schwalbenberg, Henry. 1998. “Does Foreign Aid Cause the Adoption of harmful Economic Policies?” Journal 
 of Policy Modeling 20(5): 669-675 
 
Simon, Julian L. 1987. “Population Growth, Economic Growth, and Foreign Aid.” Cato Journal (7)1: 159-193 
Solimano, Andres and Raimundo Soto. 2005. “Economic growth in Latin America in the late 20
th 
century: 
 evidence and interpretation,” CEPAL - SERIE Macroeconomía del Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile. 
 




Thomas, Vinod, and Yan Wang. 1996. "Distortions, Interventions, and Productivity Growth: Is East Asia 
 Different?" Economic Development and Cultural Change 44(2):265-288 
 45 
 
van de Walle, Nicolas. 2005. Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries. Washington, DC: Center for 
 Global Development. 
 
Vasquez, Ian. 1998. “Official assistance, economic freedom, and policy change: is foreign aid like 
 champagne?” Cato Journal 18(2): 275-286 
 
Veiderpass, Ann and Per-Åke Andersson. 2001. “Foreign Aid, Economic Growth and Efficiency 
 Development: A Data Envelopment Analysis Approach,” Working Paper 333, Swedish Agency for 
 Development Evaluation, Goteburg: Goteburg University.  
 
Voivodas, C.S. 1973. “Exports, Foreign Capital Inflow and Economic Growth.” Journal of  International 
 Economics 3(4): 337-349 
 
World Bank World Development Indicators: World Bank. World Development Indicators 2010.  Online: 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project 2010. Online: 
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
 
Younger, Steven. 1992. “Aid and the Dutch Disease: Macroeconomic Management When Everybody Loves 





























I. General characteristics of each executive constraint rating 
The index definitions below were taken directly from the Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual.  
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf) 
 
(1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as 
distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and 
assassinations). Examples of evidence: 
 i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored. 
 ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative. 
 iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at 
 the executive's pleasure. 
 iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and 
 can remove them at will. 
 v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive. 
 vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used. 
Note 3.4: If the executive is given limited or unlimited power by a legislature to cope with an 
emergency and relents this power after the emergency has passed, this is not a change to unlimited authority. 
 
(2) Intermediate Category 
 
(3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but limited 
restraints on the executive. Evidence: 
 i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation. 
 ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees. 
 iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as 
 prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted. 
 iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action 
 independently of the executive. 
 v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by 
 the executive. 
 vi. There is an independent judiciary. 
 vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, 
 for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military. 
 
(4) Intermediate Category 
 
(5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective 
authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. 
Examples: 
 i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for 
 action. 
 ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive. 
 iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts. 
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 iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country. 
 
(6) Intermediate Category 
 
(7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal 
to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence: 
 i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important 
 legislation. 
 ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the 
 accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office 
 (as in most parliamentary systems). 




II. Checklist of methodology questions for 2010 press freedom 
The index checklist below was taken directly from the Freedom House website. 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org) 
A. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT (0–30 POINTS)  
 
1. Do the constitution or other basic laws contain provisions designed to protect freedom of the press and of 
expression, and are they enforced? (0–6 points)  
2. Do the penal code, security laws, or any other laws restrict reporting, and are journalists punished under these 
laws? (0–6 points)  
3. Are there penalties for libeling officials or the state, and are they enforced? (0–3 points)  
4. Is the judiciary independent, and do courts judge cases concerning the media impartially? (0–3 points)  
5. Is freedom of information legislation in place, and are journalists able to make use of it? (0–2 points)  
6. Can individuals or business entities legally establish and operate private media outlets without undue interference? 
(0–4 points)  
7. Are media regulatory bodies, such as a broadcasting authority or national press or communications council, able to 
operate freely and independently? (0–2 points)  
8. Is there freedom to become a journalist and to practice journalism, and can professional groups freely support 
journalists‟ rights and interests? (0–4 points)  
 
B. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT (0–40 POINTS)  
1. To what extent are media outlets‟ news and information content determined by the government or a particular 
partisan interest? (0–10 points)  
2. Is access to official or unofficial sources generally controlled? (0–2 points)  
3. Is there official or unofficial censorship? (0–4 points)  
4. Do journalists practice self-censorship? (0–4 points)  
5. Do people have access to media coverage that is robust and reflects a diversity of viewpoints? (0–4 points)  
6. Are both local and foreign journalists able to cover the news freely? (0–6 points)  
7. Are journalists or media outlets subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any 
other actor? (0–10 points)  
 
C. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT (0–30 POINTS)  
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1. To what extent are media owned or controlled by the government, and does this influence their diversity of views? 
(0–6 points)  
2.Is media ownership transparent, thus allowing consumers to judge the impartiality of the news? (0–3 points)  
3. Is media ownership highly concentrated, and does it influence diversity of content? (0–3 points)  
4. Are there restrictions on the means of journalistic production and distribution? (0–4 points)  
5. Are there high costs associated with the establishment and operation of media outlets? (0–4 points) 
6. Do the state or other actors try to control the media through allocation of advertising or subsidies? (0–3 
points)  
7. Do journalists receive payment from private or public sources whose design is to influence their journalistic 
content? (0–3 points)  
8. Does the economic situation in a country accentuate media dependency on the state, political parties, big 
business, or other influential political actors for funding? (0–4 points) 
 
 
III. General characteristics of each civil liberties rating 
The index definitions below were taken directly from the Freedom House website. 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org) 
 
Rating of 1 – Countries and territories that receive a rating of 1 for political rights come closest 
to ensuring the freedoms embodied in the checklist questions, beginning with free and fair 
elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other political groupings, 
and the opposition play an important role and have actual power. Minority groups have 
reasonable self-government or can participate in the government through informal consensus. 
Rating of 2 – Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those rated 1. 
Such factors as political corruption, violence, political discrimination against minorities, and 
foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the quality of freedom. 
Ratings of 3, 4, 5 – The same conditions that undermine freedom in countries and territories 
with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5. Other 
damaging elements can include civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, lingering 
royal power, unfair elections, and one-party dominance. However, states and territories in these 
categories may still enjoy some elements of political rights, including the freedom to organize 
quasi-political groups, reasonably free referendums, or other significant means of popular 
influence on government. 
 
Civil Liberties 
Rating of 1 – Countries and territories that receive a rating of 1 come closest to ensuring the 
freedoms expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, and religion. They are distinguished by an established and generally 
equitable system of rule of law. Countries and territories with this rating enjoy free economic 
activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity. 
 
Rating of 2 – States and territories with a rating of 2 have deficiencies in a few aspects of civil 
liberties, but are still relatively free. 
 
Ratings of 3, 4, 5 – Countries and territories that have received a rating of 3, 4, or 5 range from 
those that are in at least partial compliance with virtually all checklist standards to those with a 
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combination of high or medium scores for some questions and low or very low scores on other 
questions. The level of oppression increases at each successive rating level, including in the 
areas of censorship, political terror, and the prevention of free association. There are also many 
cases in which groups opposed to the state engage in political terror that undermines other 
freedoms. 
 
Rating of 6 – People in countries and territories with a rating of 6 experience severely restricted 
rights of expression and association, and there are almost always political prisoners and other 
manifestations of political terror. These countries may be characterized by a few partial rights, 
such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly restricted private business activity, 
and relatively free private discussion. 
 
Rating of 7 – States and territories with a rating of 7 have virtually no freedom. An 



























Individual Accountability Index Components 
Table 6. Parameter Estimates for Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Models of Economic Growth in Latin American Countries for Each Separate 
Accountability Component, 1996 to 2008. 
    Bureaucratic Quality  Press Freedom  Executive Constraints Independent Judiciary 
Domestic Credit to 
the Private Sector 
Variable   b  z b z b z b z b z 
Intercept  2.867 1.04 6.277 2.48** 0.592 0.20 4.980 1.78* 1.549 0.62 
            
ODA (+)  0.002 0.33 0.005 0.9 0.000 0.02 0.001 0.17 0.002 0.32 
Bureaucratic Quality (+)  0.502 0.77 … … … … … … … … 
Press Freedom (+)  … … -0.056 -3.01*** … … … … … … 
Executive Constraint (+)  … … … … 0.523 1.33 … … … … 
Independent Judiciary (+)  … … … … … … -0.550 -1.44 … … 
Domestic Credit to the            
           Private Sector (+)  … … … … … … … … -0.041 -2.44** 
Trade Openness (+)  0.025 2.82*** 0.0172 2.09** 0.029 3.12*** 0.021 2.39** 0.025 2.82*** 
Inflation Rate (-)  -0.042 -1.65* -0.046 -1.92* -0.046 -1.86* -0.048 -1.95* -0.050 -1.99** 
Population Rate (-)  0.283 0.51 0.565 1.21 0.411 0.78 0.217 0.36 0.651 1.83* 
% Secondary School (+)  0.040 1.75* 0.037 1.74* 0.039 1.73* 0.032 1.39 0.048 2.55** 
Government Consump. (-)  -0.148 -1.93* -0.134 -1.88* -0.139 -1.83* -0.137 -1.80* -0.228 
-
3.01*** 
Energy Usage (+)  0.000 0.16 0.000 0.76 0.000 0.17 0.000 0.05 0.001 1.04 
Civil Liberties (-)  -0.004 -0.01 -0.546 -1.54 -0.085 -0.23 -0.341 -0.89 -0.257 -0.71 
Initial GDP Growth Rate (-)  0.000 -0.16 0.000 -0.20 0.000 0.27 0.000 0.21 0.000 -0.78 
Polity Score (+)  -0.194 -1.50 -0.111 -0.86 -0.401 -2.04** -0.208 -1.60 0.212 2.16** 
            
            
N  260 260 260 260 246 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual gross domestic product growth rate.  
 *p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed 
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Individual Accountability Index Components 
Table 7. Parameter Estimates for Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Models of Economic Growth in Latin American Countries for Each Separate 
Accountability Component With Interaction, 1996 to 2008. 
   Interaction 
Bureaucratic 






to the Private 
Sector 
Variable b z b  z b z b z b z b z 
Intercept 6.874 1.93* 2.867 1.04 6.277 2.48** 0.592 0.20 4.980 1.78* 1.549 0.62 
            
ODA (+) 
-
0.0003 -0.05 0.002 0.33 0.005 0.9 0.000 0.02 0.001 0.17 0.002 0.32 
Bureaucratic Quality (+)  0.502 0.77 … … … … … … … … 
Press Freedom (+)  … … -0.056 -3.01*** … … … … … … 
Executive Constraint (+)  … … … … 0.523 1.33 … … … … 
Independent Judiciary 
(+)  … … … … … … -0.550 -1.44 … … 
Domestic Credit to the            
           Private Sector (+)  … … … … … … … … -0.041 -2.44** 
Interaction (+) 0.005 0.61           
Trade Openness (+) 0.030 2.75*** 0.025 2.82*** 0.0172 2.09** 0.029 3.12*** 0.021 2.39** 0.025 2.82*** 
Inflation Rate (-) -0.039 -1.55 -0.042 -1.65* -0.046 -1.92* -0.046 -1.86* -0.048 -1.95* -0.050 -1.99** 
Population Rate (-) 0.166 0.27 0.283 0.51 0.565 1.21 0.411 0.78 0.217 0.36 0.651 1.83* 
% Secondary School (+) 0.046 2.09** 0.040 1.75* 0.037 1.74* 0.039 1.73* 0.032 1.39 0.048 2.55** 
Government Consum. (-) -0.201 -2.82*** -0.148 -1.93* -0.134 -1.88* -0.139 -1.83* -0.137 -1.80* -0.228 
-
3.01*** 
Energy Usage (+) 0.000 0.51 0.000 0.16 0.000 0.76 0.000 0.17 0.000 0.05 0.001 1.04 
Civil Liberties (-) -0.506 -1.19 -0.004 -0.01 -0.546 -1.54 -0.085 -0.23 -0.341 -0.89 -0.257 -0.71 
Initial GDP Growth Rate 
(-) 0.000 -0.89 0.000 -0.16 0.000 -0.20 0.000 0.27 0.000 0.21 0.000 -0.78 
Polity Score (+) 0.262 1.34 -0.194 -1.50 -0.111 -0.86 -0.401 -2.04** -0.208 -1.60 0.212 2.16** 
N 246 260 260 260 260 246 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual gross domestic product growth rate.  *p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. 
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Appendix C 
Descriptive Statistics of the Accountability Index Using Factor Analysis 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                          Number of obs = 257 
    Method: principal-component factors              Retained factors = 1 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                              Number of parameters = 5 
 
        Factor  |   Eigen Value   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
 
        Factor1  |      2.74904      1.85729            0.5498       0.5498 
        Factor2  |      0.89175      0.25383            0.1784       0.7282 
        Factor3  |      0.63792      0.22512            0.1276       0.8557 
        Factor4  |      0.41280      0.10432            0.0826       0.9383 
        Factor5  |      0.30848            .                  0.0617       1.0000 
    
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(10) =  410.70 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
  
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
      
Variable                                               |  Factor 1 |   Uniqueness  
     
Domestic Credit to Private Sector      |   0.6095 |      0.6285 
Bureaucratic Quality                          |   0.8008 |      0.3588 
Executive Constraint                          |   0.6232 |      0.6116 
Independence of the Judiciary            |   0.7872 |      0.3804 
Freedom of the Press                          |   0.8534 |      0.2717 
  
Scoring coefficients (method = regression) 
     
Variable                                                    |  Factor1 
 
Domestic Credit to the Private Sector     |  0.22170 
Bureaucratic Quality                               |  0.29129 
Executive Constraint                               |  0.22669 
Independence of the Judiciary                 |  0.28634 














Descriptive Statistics of All Five Models 
 
Accountability Index Without Fixed Effects 
Estimated covariances      =        19          Number of obs      =     246 
Estimated autocorrelations =      19          Number of groups   =   19 
Estimated coefficients     =        12           Obs per group: min =    12 
 
GDP Growth Rate  b 
Standard 
Error z P > |z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       
Official Development Assistance    0.003                 0.006            0.44        0.657           -0.009     0.014 
Accountability Index   -1.108                0.360            -3.08       0.002           -1.813    -0.403 
Secondary School Enrollment    0.035                0.018             1.94        0.052           -0.0003   0.071 
Government Consumption   -0.198                0.071            -2.81       0.005           -0.336    -0.060 
Trade Openness    0.011                0.008             1.35        0.177           -0.005     0.026 
Energy Use    0.0006              0.0006           1.01        0.315           -0.0006   0.002 
Civil Liberties   -0.760                0.361            -2.11       0.035            -1.47     -0.054 
Population Growth Rate    1.130                0.319              3.54       0.0002          0.504     1.756 
Inflation Rate   -0.046                0.025            -1.89       0.059            -0.095    0.002 
Polity Score    0.343                0.097              3.55       0.0004           0.154    0.533 
Initial GDP   -0.0001              0.0003          -0.30       0.765            -0.0008 0.0006 

























Accountability Index With Fixed Effects 
Estimated covariances      =        19          Number of obs      =       246 
Estimated autocorrelations =        19        Number of groups   =        19 








GDP Growth Rate   b 
Standard 
Error z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval]  
Official Development Assistance      0.009         0.009          1.02           0.307                0.008         0.026  
Accountability Index     -2.377         0.507        -4.69           0.000               -3.37         -1.381  
Secondary School Enrollment     -0.054         0.020        -2.63           0.008               -0.094       -0.014  
Government Consumption     -0.693         0.116        -5.95           0.000               -0.922       -0.465  
Trade Openness      0.100         0.017          5.84           0.000                0.067        0.134 
Energy Use      0.0008       0.001          0.74           0.460               -0.001        0.003 
Civil Liberties     -0.811         0.317        -2.56           0.011               -1.432       -0.189  
Population Growth Rate     -0.095         0.826        -0.11           0.908               -1.715        1.523  
Inflation Rate     -0.072         0.026        -2.81           0.005               -0.123       -0.022 
Polity Score      0.579         0.135          4.29           0.000                0.314        0.843 
Initial GDP     -0.002         0.002        -0.81           0.415               -0.007        0.003  
Argentina    20.014       15.736         1.27            0.203             -10.827      50.855 
Bolivia      8.912         1.818         4.90            0.000                5.349      12.475 
Brazil    20.475         7.630         2.68            0.007                5.521      35.429 
Chile    13.567         8.156         1.66            0.096               -2.417      29.552 
Colombia    14.704         5.074         2.90            0.004                4.759      24.649 
Costa Rica    10.381         6.137         1.69            0.091               -1.648      22.409 
Dominican Republic      4.185         3.212         1.30            0.193               -2.111      10.481 
Ecuador      4.965         2.353         2.11            0.035                 0.353       9.576 
El Salvador      2.829         3.250         0.87            0.384                -3.541       9.199 
Guatemala      2.084         2.119         0.98            0.325                -2.070       6.238 
Mexico    12.208       10.015         1.22            0.223                -7.421     31.837 
Nicaragua      1.156         1.333         0.87            0.386                -1.457       3.769 
Panama      4.465         5.559         0.80            0.422                -6.430     15.361 
Paraguay     -0.739         1.619       -0.46             0.648               -3.913       2.435 
Peru    10.431         3.487         2.99             0.003                3.597     17.266 
Uruguay    12.916        10.864        1.19             0.234               -8.377     34.208 
Venezuela    18.034        13.592        1.33             0.185               -8.605     44.673 
_constant      3.783          2.669        1.42             0.156               -1.449       9.014 
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Accountability Index and Interaction Included Without Fixed Effects 
Estimated covariances      =        19          Number of obs      =       246 
Estimated autocorrelations =        19          Number of groups   =        19 
Estimated coefficients     =        13          Obs per group: min =        12 
 
GDP Growth Rate  b Standard Error z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Official Development 
Assistance      0.002              0.006                0.34            0.731              -0.010        0.014 
Accountability Index     -1.002              0.436              -2.30            0.022              -1.855       -0.147 
Interaction     -0.001              0.008              -0.17            0.867              -0.017        0.014 
Secondary School Enrollment      0.036              0.020               1.86             0.062              -0.002        0.075 
Government Consumption    -0.197               0.072              -2.73            0.006              -0.338       -0.056 
Trade Openness     0.011               0.009               1.34             0.180              -0.005        0.028 
Energy Use     0.0005             0.0007             0.67             0.503              -0.0009      0.002 
Civil Liberties    -0.757               0.382             -1.98             0.047              -1.506       -0.009 
Population Growth Rate     0.983               0.374              2.63              0.009               0.250        1.716 
Inflation Rate    -0.00006           0.0003           -0.18             0.858              -0.0007      0.0006 
Polity Score    -0.043               0.025             -1.76             0.078              -0.091        0.005 
Initial GDP     0.324               0.104               3.12             0.002               0.120        0.527 


























Accountability Index and Interaction Included With Fixed Effects 
Estimated covariances      =        19          Number of obs      =       246 
Estimated autocorrelations =        19          Number of groups   =        19 
Estimated coefficients     =        30          Obs per group: min =        12                                                                
 
GDP Growth Rate  b Standard Error z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Official Development 
Assistance      0.009               0.009              1.00             0.316             -0.009          0.028 
Accountability Index    -2.881                0.632            -4.56             0.000             -4.12           -1.642 
Interaction     0.016                0.011              1.45             0.147             -0.006          0.038 
Trade Openness     0.104                0.017              6.03             0.000              0.070          0.137 
Secondary School Enrollment    -0.056                0.021            -2.65             0.008             -0.097         -0.014 
Government Consumption    -0.677                0.117            -5.80             0.000             -0.906         -0.448 
Energy Use     0.0006              0.001              0.59             0.557             -0.002          0.003 
Civil Liberties    -0.826                0.323            -2.56             0.010             -1.459         -0.194 
Population Growth Rate     0.094                0.825              0.11             0.909             -1.524          1.712 
Inflation Rate   -0.0002               0.0008          -0.24             0.812             -0.002          0.001 
Polity Score   -0.068                 0.026            -2.64             0.008             -0.118          -0.018 
Initial GDP     0.644                0.138              4.68             0.000              0.374          0.915 
Argentina     8.220                4.959              1.66             0.097             -1.499        17.939 
Bolivia     6.972                1.912              3.65             0.000               3.225       10.719 
Brazil   14.93                  2.780              5.37             0.000               9.480       20.374 
Chile      7.688                3.226              2.38             0.017               1.365       14.010 
Colombia   10.454                1.797              5.82             0.000               6.933       13.976 
Costa Rica    4.866                 2.542              1.91             0.056             -0.116          9.848 
Dominican Republic    0.841                 1.527              0.55             0.581             -2.151          3.833 
Ecuador    3.0006               1.704              1.76             0.078             -0.339          6.341 
El Salvador    0.578                 1.345            -0.43              0.667             -3.214          2.058 
Guatemala   -1.452                 1.461             0.99              0.320             -4.314          1.41 
Mexico    4.269                 2.981              1.43             0.152             -1.574        10.112 
Nicaragua    0.458                 1.544              0.30             0.767             -2.568          3.485 
Panama   -1.199                 2.534            -0.47             0.636             -6.167          3.767 
Paraguay   -3.323                 1.379            -2.41             0.016             -6.025         -0.621 
Peru    7.559                 1.399              5.40             0.000              4.816        10.303 
Uruguay    8.116                 3.862              2.10             0.036              0.548        15.685 
Venezuela    4.179                 4.243              0.98             0.325             -4.138       12.495 






Disaggregated Index Without Fixed Effects 
Estimated covariances      =        19          Number of obs      =       246 
Estimated autocorrelations =        19          Number of groups   =        19 
Estimated coefficients     =        16          Obs per group: min =        12                                                                
 
GDP Growth Rate  b 
Standard 
Error z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Official Development 
Assistance     0.001             0.006              0.25           0.805            -0.010           0.013 
Bureaucratic Quality     1.245             0.592              2.10           0.036            0.083           2.406 
Freedom of the Press    -0.039             0.019             -2.13           0.033           -0.077         -0.003 
Executive Constraints    -0.048             0.375             -0.13           0.897           -0.783          0.686 
Independence of the 
Judiciary    -0.638             0.366             -1.74           0.081           -1.355          0.079 
Domestic Credit     -0.054             0.018             -2.97           0.003           -0.090         -0.018 
Secondary School 
 Enrollment     0.045             0.020              2.27            0.023            0.006          0.085 
Government Consumption    -0.201             0.071             -2.81           0.005           -0.341         -0.061 
Trade Openness     0.027             0.010              2.63            0.009           0.007          0.046 
Energy Use     0.0005           0.0007            0.69            0.489          -0.0009         0.002 
Civil Liberties    -0.436             0.340            -1.09             0.276         -1.220           0.348 
Population Growth Rate     0.392             0.523             0.75              0.454        -0.634           1.417 
Inflation Rate    -0.042             0.025            -1.70             0.089        -0.091           0.006 
Polity Score     0.321             0.169             1.90              0.057        -0.009           0.651 
Initial GDP    -0.0003           0.0004          -0.89             0.375        -0.001           0.0004 





















Disaggregated Index With Fixed Effects 
Estimated covariances      =        19          Number of obs      =       246 
Estimated autocorrelations =        19          Number of groups   =        19 
Estimated coefficients     =        33          Obs per group: min =             
 
GDP Growth Rate  b 
Standard 
Error   z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval]  
        
Official Development Assistance     0.0003             0.009                0.03           0.973              -0.017        0.018  
Bureaucratic Quality     1.093               0.730                1.50           0.135              -0.339        2.524  
Freedom of the Press    -0.109               0.024               -4.46           0.000              -0.156       -0.061  
Executive Constraints    -0.310               0.935               -0.33           0.740              -2.142       1.523  
Independence of the Judiciary    -0.618               0.324               -1.91           0.056              -1.252       0.016  
Domestic Credit     -0.071               0.025               -2.86           0.004              -0.119       -0.022 
Secondary School Enrollment    -0.037               0.028               -1.32           0.186              -0.093       0.018  
Government Consumption 
Government Consumption 
   -0.585               0.134               -4.36           0.000              -0.848       -0.322 
Trade Openness     0.088               0.017                5.35           0.000                0.056       0.121  
Energy Use     0.0008             0.001                0.69           0.493               -0.001       0.003  
Civil Liberties    -0.705               0.410              -1.72           0.085               -1.509       0.098  
Population Growth Rate     0.275               1.056               0.26            0.794               -1.795       2.35 
Inflation Rate   -0.077                0.025              -2.99           0.003               -0.127      -0.026  
Polity Score    0.564                0.427               1.32            0.187               -0.273       1.400  
Initial GDP    0.003                0.001               2.41            0.016                0.0006     0.006  
Argentina -16.961                7.136             -2.38            0.017             -30.947       -2.974 
Bolivia    6.259                1.984               3.15            0.002                2.370       10.149  
Brazil    1.106                2.777               0.40            0.690               -4.336        6.549  
Chile    -8.066               4.005               -2.01           0.044              -15.917      -0.216 
Colombia   -0.070               1.898               -0.04           0.971                -3.791       3.650 
Costa Rica   -7.969               3.026               -2.63           0.008              -13.900       -2.036 
Dominican Republic   -4.229               1.658               -2.55           0.011                 -7.480      -0.978 
Ecuador     0.164              1.689                 0.10           0.922                -3.147        3.476 
El Salvador    -4.495              2.001               -2.25           0.025                -8.419       -0.572 
Guatemala    -5.496              1.309               -4.20           0.000                -8.063       -2.929 
Mexico    -2.761              1.989               -1.39           0.165                -6.660        1.138 
Nicaragua  -13.487              4.353               -3.10           0.002              -22.021       -4.954 
Panama     0.805              1.546                 0.52           0.602                -2.224        3.836 
Paraguay    -9.334              3.502               -2.67           0.008              -16.199       -2.470 
Peru    -6.723              1.515               -4.44           0.000                -9.695       -3.752 
Uruguay  -14.883              6.123               -2.43           0.015               -26.885      -2.882 
Venezuela  -11.716              5.237               -2.24           0.025                -21.981      -1.451 
_constant    12.095              5.223                2.32           0.021                   1.856     22.334 
 59 
Bureaucratic Quality 
Estimated covariances      =        20          Number of obs      =       260 
Estimated autocorrelations =      20          Number of groups   =      20 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Time periods       =        13 
                                               
 
GDP Growth Rate  b Standard Error z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Official Development  
 
AssiAssistance 
      0.002                0.006                 0.33                 0.740            -0.009         
0.014 Bureaucratic Quality       0.502                0.655                 0.77                 0.444            -0.782         
1.786 Secondary School 
Enrollment 
      0.039                0.022                 1.75                 0.080            -0.004         
0.083 Government Consumption      -0.147                0.076               -1.93                  0.053           -0.297         
0.001 Trade Openness       0.024                0.008                 2.82                  0.005            0.007         
0.042 Energy Use       0.0001              0.0007               0.16                  0.872           -0.001         
0.001 Civil Liberties      -0.003                0.388               -0.01                   0.992           -0.765         
0.758 Population Growth Rate       0.283                0.555                 0.51                   0.610           -0.805         
1.371 Inflation Rate      -0.042                0.025               -1.65                   0.099            -0.092         
0.008 Polity Score      -0.193                0.129               -1.50                   0.135            -0.447         
0.060 Initial GDP      -0.00006            0.0003             -0.16                   0.877            -0.0008       




























Estimated covariances      =        20          Number of obs      =       260 
Estimated autocorrelations =      20          Number of groups   =    20 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Time periods       =        13 
                                                 
 
GDP Growth Rate  b 
Standard 
Error z P > |z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       
Official Development 
Assistanc 
    0.005                 0.005          0.90              0.366            -0.006      0.016 
Freedom of the Press    -0.056                 0.018        -3.01              0.003            -0.092     -0.019 
Secondary School 
Enrollment 
    0.036                 0.020          1.74              0.082            -0.004      0.077 
Government Consumption    -0.133                 0.071        -1.88              0.060            -0.272      0.005 
Trade Openness     0.017                 0.008          2.09              0.036             0.001      0.033 
Energy Use     0.0005               0.0007        0.76              0.447            -0.0008    0.001 
Civil Liberties   -0.545                  0.353        -1.54              0.123             -1.239      0.147 
Population Growth Rate     0.565                 0.465          1.21              0.224             -0.346     1.477 
Inflation Rate    -0.046                 0.024        -1.92              0.054             -0.093     0.0008 
Polity Score    -0.110                 0.129        -0.86              0.392             -0.363     0.142 
Initial GDP    -0.00007             0.0003      -0.20              0.841             -0.0007   0.0006 




























Estimated covariances      =        20          Number of obs      =       260 
Estimated autocorrelations =      20          Number of groups   =     20 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Time periods       =        13 
                                                 
GDP Growth Rate  b 
Standard 
Error z P > |z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       
Official Development 
Assistance    0.00009         0.006              0.02               0.988           -0.012      0.012 
Executive Constraints    0.522             0.393             1.33                0.184           -0.248      1.293 
Secondary School 
Enrollment    0.038             0.022            1.73                 0.083           -0.005      0.082 
Government Consumption   -0.139             0.075          -1.83                 0.067            -0.287       0.009 
Trade Openness    0.028             0.009            3.12                 0.002             0.010       0.045 
Energy Use    0.0001           0.0007          0.17                 0.865            -0.001       0.001 
Civil Liberties   -0.085             0.377          -0.23                 0.822            -0.825       0.655 
Population Growth Rate    0.411             0.524            0.78                 0.433            -0.617       1.440 
Inflation Rate  -0.046              0.025          -1.86                 0.064            -0.095       0.002 
Polity Score  -0.401              0.196           -2.04                0.041            -0.786      -0.015 
Initial GDP   0.0001            0.0003           0.27                0.790            -0.0006     0.0008 

























Independence of the Judiciary 
Estimated covariances      =        20          Number of obs      =       260 
Estimated autocorrelations =      20          Number of groups   =     20 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Time periods       =        13 
                                                 
GDP Growth Rate  b 
Standard 
Error z P > |z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       
Official Development 
Assistance    0.001              0.006              0.17              0.867          -0.011       0.013 
Independence of the 
Judiciary  -0.550               0.381            -1.44               0.149         -1.298      0.197 
Secondary School 
Enrollment   0.032               0.023              1.39               0.164           -0.013      0.077 
Government Consumption  -0.136               0.075            -1.80               0.072           -0.285      0.012 
Trade Openness   0.020               0.008              2.39               0.017            0.003      0.037 
Energy Use   0.00003           0.0007            0.05               0.957           -0.001      0.001 
Civil Liberties -0.341                0.381            -0.89               0.371           -1.089      0.406 
Population Growth Rate   0.217               0.609              0.36               0.721           -0.977      1.412 
Inflation Rate -0.048                0.024            -1.95               0.051           -0.096      0.0002 
Polity Score -0.208                0.130            -1.60               0.110           -0.463      0.047 
Initial GDP   0.00007            0.0003           0.21               0.832           -0.0006    0.0008 

























Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
Estimated covariances      =        19          Number of obs      =       246 
Estimated autocorrelations =      19          Number of groups   =       19 
Estimated coefficients     =        12          Obs per group: min =        12 
 
GDP Growth Rate  b 
Standard 
Error z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Official Development Assistance      0.001             0.006               0.32               0.752          -0.009        0.013 
Domestic Credit to the Private  
Sector     -0.040             0.016              -2.44              0.015          -0.073       -0.007 
Secondary School Enrollment      0.047             0.018               2.55               0.011           0.011        0.084 
Government Consumption     -0.228             0.075              -3.01              0.003          -0.377       -0.079 
Trade Openness      0.025             0.008               2.82               0.005           0.007        0.042 
Energy Use      0.0007           0.0007             1.04               0.300          -0.0006      0.002 
Civil Liberties    -0.257              0.362              -0.71              0.478          -0.967        0.453 
Population Growth Rate     0.651              0.355               1.83               0.067          -0.044        1.347 
Inflation Rate    -0.050              0.025              -1.99              0.047          -0.099      -0.0007 
Polity Score     0.211              0.098               2.16               0.031           0.019        0.404 
Initial GDP   -0.0002             0.0003            -0.78              0.437           -0.001       0.0004 
Constant     1.549              2.494               0.62               0.535           -3.340       6.438 
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